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Abstract—This article presents a new method for detecting a 
source point of time based network steganography - MoveSteg. A 
steganography carrier could be an example of multimedia stream 
made with packets. These packets are then delayed intentionally 
to send hidden information using time based steganography 
methods. The presented analysis describes a method that allows 
finding the source of steganography stream in network that is 
under our management.   
 
Keywords—network steganography, information, hiding 
network, detection of new attacks 
I. INTRODUCTION 
TEGANOLOGY is a science which has noted a 
considerable increase in interest in recent years. It is 
divided into two areas: steganography and stegoanalysis. The 
former deals with techniques of hiding information in a sent 
medium which may be, for instance, a stream of packets. 
Unlike cryptography, steganography consists in hiding the fact 
that information is being exchanged. The purpose of the other 
area mentioned above is to analyze media of various types 
from the perspective of information hidden in them.  
The most popular network steganographic techniques are 
those using sporadically used IP and TCP header fields [4] or 
even dedicated payload [2]. A variety of network 
steganography which is more rarely encountered, but is 
nonetheless equally interesting, is the one using time 
dependencies between consecutive packets in a given stream. 
This class of methods is often based on intentional delaying of 
some messages in order to modulate intervals between 
consecutive messages. Delays modulated in this manner may 
be received and interpreted as a series of bits on the far end of 
communication link [1]. An example of a method which in-
cludes the elements of both techniques mentioned above is a 
hybrid method referred to as LACK (Lost Audio Packets 
Steganography) proposed in [3]. It uses time dependencies 
between packets in a given stream, by intentionally delaying 
packets to such an extent that at the moment of sending them, 
they are no longer useful and will be rejected on the 
transmission receiver’s side. This method uses a payload of 
delayed packets as a steganographic carrier. An example of 
this may be a multimedia stream using the RTP protocol in 
which consecutive datagrams are sent every 20 ms, and the 
intentional delay varies from 30 ms to 70 ms [3]. 
A considerable majority of scientific papers and dissertations 
on steganology focuses on newer, more effective and efficient 
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methods of detection of hidden information [2] [4] [7]. This 
refers to both information hidden in multimedia carriers such 
as images, movies or music, but also in network traffic. This 
paper focuses on another aspect of steganoanalysis, namely 
detection of a point from which hidden information is sent. 
Almost all newest solutions and security measures in 
cybersecurity treat protection from threats as a passive act, 
which consists in building a wall, as effective as possible, be-
tween the attackers and the sensitive resources we wish to 
protect. Using the method described in this paper, it is possible 
to find a point which is a source of steganography transmission 
in a network managed by us. This allows us to take appropriate 
measures at the source. 
II. AN IDEA OF MOVESTEG 
A.  Description of the method 
The method referred to in this paper was initially described 
in [6]. The main phenomenon occurring in telecommunication 
networks, which is used in this method, is blurring time 
dependencies between consecutive packets in a stream along 
with the number of passes through subsequent transmission 
devices on a full path length from the transmission source to its 
destination. This happens irrespective of the transmission 
medium, therefore in transmission systems which require very 
accurate synchronization (e.g. SDH), a strong emphasis is put 
on very accurate synchronization of devices building 
a network.  
An example of this may be an IP network and a multimedia 
stream sent through it, using an RTP protocol to transmit 
sound. Due to a limited network efficiency and capacity, 
packets sent at equal intervals at the source, reach the 
addressee with various delays. This is a reason for using 
buffers on the receiver’s side, which allows to compensate for 
the effects of irregular receiving parts of the signal sent. In the 
event when the network is heavily overloaded with the packets 
sent, a situation may occur that a part of a signal reaches the 
receiver too late that is after a consecutive part has reached it. 
The phenomenon of blurring time dependencies may be used 
to find a source of network steganography. As it is 
demonstrated in the following part of this paper, by examining 
a delay between consecutive packets, we are able to state that 
parameters such as delay minimum value, delay maximum 
value, delay average value and standard deviation vary 
depending on the distance from the source. In addition, by 
analyzing a histogram of packets delays, we are able to assign 
packets belonging to one stream to one of several groups (the 
number of groups depends on the type of the steganographic 
method). By analyzing the distribution of delays, we are able 
to state where the beginning and the end of the steganographic 
channel are. An example of a histogram of delays between 
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consecutive packets in a stream, along with an instruction on 
how to interpret it, is presented in Section 4 of this paper. 
B. Assumptions and limitations 
A success and efficiency of this method depend on several 
assumptions which have to be met. The first one is that it is 
necessary to analyze every stream between any pair of 
communicating hosts, as a separate stream. Information, that is 
the source host, the target host, the sequence number, and the 
time of receiving the last packet, must be stored for every 
stream flowing through every node participating in the 
measurements. Another assumption which has to be met is that 
there has to be one central place in which all the paths in our 
network are known, which allows to correlate results from the 
entire route of a given stream used as a steganographic carrier. 
Another assumption, equally important to the previous one, is 
an ability to detect steganography via nodes used for analysis. 
The last assumption is a possibility to accurately measure the 
time interval between consecutive packets of a given stream. 
Depending on the frequency of sending packets used as a ste-
ganographic carrier, measuring time with appropriate accuracy 
is necessary.  
This method has its several limitations which decrease its 
efficiency or even make it impossible to use it. The first and 
most important limitation to the method is the type of 
steganography detected. The method works only for 
steganography using time dependencies between consecutive 
stream packets, irrespective of whether these are methods 
directly using delays or the hybrid ones. Another limitation is a 
negative impact of multipath traffic on the method efficiency. 
This means that if a selected steganography method allows for 
a transmission via several separate paths (for in-stance, a 
steganographic carrier is several parallel multimedia streams, 
each of which is sent via different route), such traffic 
 is much more difficult to analyze. An accurate 
synchronization and correlation of measurements taken from 
various nodes is then necessary, which is not always possible. 
The last  
 
Fig. 1. Line topology consisting of 50 hosts  
limitation worth mentioning is the impact of nodes disturbing 
time dependencies on the method efficiency. As demonstrated 
in the next section of the paper, nodes which modify delays 
(for instance, as a result of their overload), cause total blurring 
of time relations between the packets. 
III.  SIMULATION ENVIRONMENT  
In order to examine the efficiency of the method presented in 
the previous section, a simulation environment was created, 
allowing to dynamically define input parameters and a 
topology of the network used. The environment consists of a 
group of virtual machines which are managed by one central 
server connected with a database storing measurement results. 
VirtualBox 5.0 was used as virtualization software, the 
managing server was written in Python 2.7, the database 
engine is MySQL Community 5.7, the system of virtual 
machines is Alpine Linux 3.2. The entire environment was 
launched on one physical machine with a quad core 3.2 GHz 
processor and 12 GB of RAM, an operating system launched 
on this machine was Ubuntu 14.04 LTS.  
The main and most important part of the environment was 
the server which dealt with the setup of hosts and a virtualizer, 
but was also responsible for defining experiments, sending 
commands and collecting results of a completed test. The 
virtual machines were set up to send traffic in line with the 
routing table known to them, obtained through an OSPF 
protocol launched on every host. The network setup in the 
virtualizer involved creating a relevant number of private 
networks consisting of exactly two interfaces, one from each 
directly connected host. 
This paper focuses on two network topologies, that is a line 
and a Manhattan-type network. The former will easily allow to 
present phenomena occurring in the network when sending 
network steganography using time dependencies between 
packets, and the latter will present the impact of network 
topology complexity on the efficiency of the method. Both 
topologies referred to above are schematically presented in 
Fig. 1 and 2. 
 
Fig. 2. Manhattan-type topology consisting of 36 hosts  
It should be highlighted that for the Manhattan-type 
topology, the network structure from the perspective of, for 
instance, host number 0, and taking into account the paths 
traced by the OSPF protocol, is as depicted in Fig. 3.  
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Fig. 3. Manhattan-type topology from the perspective of node 
0, taking into account routes traced by a routing protocol, 
consisting of 36 hosts  
Such a transformation of the scheme allows to considerably 
simplify the traffic analysis. 
IV.  RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS  
To depict the options the method provides, simulations of two 
network topologies described above are presented below, that 
is a line topology consisting of 50 nodes and a Manhattan-type 
topology consisting of 36 nodes. The former will allow to 
explain how the method works in a simple way, and the latter 
will demonstrate the options and efficiency of the method 
involving a more complicated network.   
A. Line topology 
The first case presented below will use a LACK 
steganographic method. The source node will be node 0, and 
the receiver node will be node 49. A steganographic channel is 
over the entire transmission length. A steganographic carrier is 
UDP packets sent at the source at equal intervals. All the 
parameters are presented in Table I.  
TABLE I  
Input parameters, case no. 1  
Parameter Value Unit 
T1 20 ms 
T2 30 ms 
P 15 % 
The meaning of the parameters is the following: T1 is the 
nominal value of delay between consecutive packets sent from 
the source. T2 is a value by which packets used for 
steganographic transmission are delayed. Both parameters 
referred to above have been selected according to the values in 
[3]. The last parameter is P – this is the percentage of traffic 
carrying hidden information in relation to all packets of a 
given stream. In a majority of cases, this parameter assumes 
much lower values within the range of several per cent, but the 
value assumed will allow to better present how the method 
works. The simulation duration time for all cases described in 
this paper was assumed to be 120 seconds.  
In the first case, the analysis of time dependencies will be 
launched in all nodes at the entire route length. Once the 
simulation has been completed, information on the packets 
sent is collected in the server which saves it in the database. 
Next, a histogram of delay between consecutive packets is set 
for every node, along with the values of minimum, maximum 
and average delay between consecutive packets; in addition a 
standard deviation is established. Then, histograms are 
combined in the relevant order, which allows to see how time 
dependencies change with the distance increase. The histogram 
described above is presented below.  
The X axis of the histogram contains node numbers, that is 
values from 1 to 48 (the sending and the receiving node are not 
included in the traffic analysis). The Y axis contains the value 
of delay between consecutive packets expressed in 
microseconds. The Z axis presents the number of packets 
which match a given range, that is a number of packets whose 
delay versus the previous packet fell within the range of a 
given bin. The number of bins in every histogram is 100. The 
interval of bins for every case described in this paper was 
established by dividing the difference between the maximum 
and the minimum value of delay by 100. Groups into which 
the stream used for steganographic purposes is divided are 
marked with letters A, B and C. It should be highlighted here 
that the histogram described above refers to the traffic related 
to only one UDP stream sent from node 0 to node 49. A group 
of packets containing hidden information has been market with 
letter A. These packets are delayed by 10 milliseconds on 
average with respect to the preceding packet. This is the case 
because, as it has already been mentioned above, these packets 
are intentionally delayed by additional 30 milliseconds, so they 
are sent after their successor already at the source. Sending 
packets at regular intervals of 20 ms and then delaying one of 
them by additional 30 ms is a reason for some 10 millisecond 
delay with respect to the predecessor. In line with the input 
parameters, in this case this is some 15% of all packets of the 
stream under analysis. The most numerous group of packets is 
marked with letter B – these are packets which were not 
intentionally delayed, therefore their average delay is some 20 
ms. In addition, they do not carry stenograms. This group 
contains some 70% of all packets of the stream. Packets which 
were sent just before the ones containing hidden information 
are marked with letter C. Their average delay with respect to 
their predecessor is some 40 ms, that is twice as much as the 
value of T1. This group’s number corresponds to group A, 
which is also some 15% of the entire traffic.  
  K. SZCZYPIORSKI, T.TYL 
 
 
Fig. 4. Histogram of delays between consecutive packets for every node. Case no. 1 
 
  
Fig. 5. Plot showing the minimum, maximum and average 
value in case no. 1  
 
As expected, the minimum value of delay slightly decreases, 
the maximum delay increases and the average value changes 
the least and also increases. Movement of the average value 
towards longer delays is due to the fact that the time of a 
packet processing in each node, irrespective of the packet, is 
non-zero. The marginal values (minimum and maximum) go 
with every consecutive node to the extreme, because when 
packets are sent at equal intervals at the source, after the first 
node most of them still preserve time dependence with respect 
to the neighbouring packets, yet after several subsequent 
nodes, due to random events occurring in the network and in 
every node, the dependencies become levelled out. As depicted 
in the histogram, the distribution of delays resembles a bell in 
its shape. Initially, the bell is slender and tall, then it becomes 
lower and broader with the route length. The next plot presents 
a standard deviation of delay of packets which belong to 
group A. 
 
 
 Fig. 6. Standard deviation in case no. 1  
A 
B 
C 
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Fig. 7. Histogram of delays between consecutive packets for every node. Case no 2 
 
As presented in the plot above (Fig. 6), the value which 
changes the most along with the way covered by the packets, is 
the standard deviation of the delay between consecutive 
packets. This confirms the change in the shape of the 
histogram for nodes located at the end of the route. 
Another example in this topology is a case using modulation 
of delay between consecutive packets in order to assign 
“zeros” and “ones”. This method consists in intentional 
delaying a packet to signal a logical “one” to the party 
receiving the steganogram, or in intentional advancing (a 
buffer is required in which we will store a specific number of 
messages) in order to assign a logical “zero” (assignment of 
“zeros” and “ones” may be reverse). Similarly to the previous 
case described above, nodes with numbers from 1 to 48 will be 
colleting information on time dependencies between 
consecutive packets. As an additional element in this case, we 
will introduce unintentional delay in node no. 15. The purpose 
of this is to simulate an overloaded network node, which 
inadvertently introduces delays to all packets that pass through 
it. Delay is added on the outgoing interface of the host with a 
tool available in Linux, that is Traffic Control [5]. The 
distribution of the delay is normal, with an average value of 30 
ms and a standard deviation of 15 ms. The other input 
parameters are described in the table II.  
Analogically to the previous case, a histogram was calculated 
for every node, and then the histograms were combined into 
one three-dimensional histogram presented below in Fig. 7. 
 
 
TABLE II 
 Input parameters, case no. 2 
Parameter Value Unit 
T1 50 ms 
T2 25 Ms 
P 5 % 
L 100  
 
Similarly to the previous example, the main part of the 
multimedia stream is initially focused on one value equal to 50 
ms, (that is the value of parameter T1). The packets used for 
modulation of the bits which are a steganogram constitute a 
much smaller part of the whole. Small peaks are visible near 
the delays amounting to 25 ms and 75 ms (T1 ± T2). Both 
peaks comprise 5% of all packets. At node 15 which disturbs 
time dependencies, we can see that the groups which have 
been clearly differentiable so far, have been totally mixed with 
each other, and the number of packets allocated to each bin is 
similar. The vertical edge visible for delays equal to 0 ms is 
due to the fact that the Traffic Control tool is unable to 
accelerate the packets (impose a negative delay on them), all 
these packets were sent immediately after their arrival in the 
node.  
Let us look now at the diagrams presenting the minimum, 
maximum and average value of delay between consecutive 
packets. In this case, all packets of the multimedia stream are 
taken into consideration.  
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Fig. 8.Diagram presenting the minimum, maximum and 
average value of case no. 2  
The plot in Fig. 8 presents the extent of impact which strong 
noises and disturbances created in heavily loaded or damaged 
network devices have on the method efficiency and a 
possibility to select the groups which are part of the stream. 
Below, a diagram of standard deviation is presented, which is 
also strongly disturbed from node 15 by introduced 
disturbance of time dependencies. 
 
 
 
Fig. 9. Diagram of standard deviation in case no. 2 
B. Manhattan-type topology 
A more complicated case, in which network topology was 
depicted in Fig. 2, will now be presented. The node sending a 
multimedia (and steganographic) stream is node number 0. The 
recipients of transmission are two hosts number 5 and 35. 
Every topology may be presented in a perspective in which a 
given host can see it, in this case it was depicted in Fig. 3. As it  
 
 
 
Fig. 10. Histogram of delays between consecutive packets for every node. Case no. 2 
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has been stated before, this transformation is a result of paths 
traced by the OSPF routing protocol. The nodes collecting data 
on packet delays will be nodes number 1, 6, 7, 3, 9, 15, 21, 20, 
19, 18, 34, 28, 29 (the selected nodes create three “walls” 
between node 0 and 35 in the topology diagram). LACK will 
be the steganographic method used. An additional element is a 
disturbing node no. 12 which delays every packet by 30ms ± 
15ms with a correlation between the value of the delay added 
with respect to the previous one equal to 15%. The simulation 
duration time is identical to the previous ones and amounts to 
120 seconds, the other parameters are presented in the table 
below. 
TABLE III  
Input parameters, case no. 3 
Parameter Value Unit 
T1 20 ms 
T2 30 ms 
P 5 % 
 
Identically to the two previous cases, a histogram for every 
network node was created (Fig. 10).  
The histogram analysis itself allows to state that in this case 
it is difficult to unambiguously conclude that time 
dependencies along with subsequent nodes on the path will be 
blurring. Several first nodes in which we collect measurements 
have active probes have a histogram of delays that is very 
similar, then everything becomes blurred by disturbances 
introduced in node no. 12. With such a small number of nodes 
collecting measurements and under the influence of external 
disturbance, we are unable to conclude where the source of the 
steganographic stream is, even despite two separate streams, 
which theoretically should demonstrate that in the proximity of 
node 0, time dependencies are precisely established, and along 
with departing from it, both in the direction of node 5 and 35, 
time dependencies blur (similarly as in the first case 
presented). 
V. CONCLUSIONS  
The method MoveSteg previously proposed in [6], in line with 
what has been described in the previous sections, allows to 
observe the process of blurring time dependencies between 
packets. This phenomenon occurs irrespective of whether a 
given packet is used as a steganographic carrier. The 
conclusions presented in this paper may serve to detect the 
source sending steganography in our network.  
The scenario of using this method in real world is the 
following. With a server in our network seized by a criminal 
(hacker), from which a steganographic stream is sent in several 
directions via other paths, we are able to find the source of 
steganography by analyzing the traffic from the sufficiently 
large number of nodes. The seized server may introduce 
disturbances to time dependencies not only in streams which 
originate in it, but also in the ones that pass through it. If we 
are able to analyze the traffic for every of such passing 
streams, we will notice groups of packets which were 
described in Section 4.1. Along with the growing distance 
from such a server, every group will be undergoing an 
increasing blurring. By collecting and correlating several such 
observations, we will be able to indicate which node in the 
network is conducting steganographic transmission. 
A weakness of this method is its dependence on the number 
of sounds on the path of the stream used as a steganographic 
carrier. With a small number of hosts collecting measurements, 
we are unable to state with sufficient certainty, whether along 
with the increasing distance from the suspicious node, time 
dependencies in streams become blurred. Another weakness of 
this method is the analysis sensitivity to disturbances 
introduced unintentionally by other elements of the network, 
for instance heavily overloaded or damaged transmission 
devices. There may be a case when a node suspected to send 
steganography is in fact an old server with insufficient 
resources.  
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